Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and private-label mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed by nonprime loans played a central role in the recent financial crisis. Little is known, however, about the underlying forces that drove investor demand for these securitizations. Using micro-data on insurers' and mutual funds' bond holdings, we find considerable heterogeneity in investor demand for securitizations in the pre-crisis period. We argue that both investor beliefs and incentives help to explain this variation in demand. By contrast, our data paints a more uniform picture of investor behavior in the crisis. Consistent with theories of optimal liquidation, investors largely traded in more liquid securities such as government-guaranteed MBS to meet their liquidity needs during the crisis. Despite general agreement on this broad narrative, there is little consensus about the deeper forces that drove the rise and subsequent fall in investor demand for CDOs and nonprime MBS.
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Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and private-label mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed by nonprime loans were at the heart of the recent financial crisis. Issuance of these Despite general agreement on this broad narrative, there is little consensus about the deeper forces that drove the rise and subsequent fall in investor demand for CDOs and nonprime MBS.
Broadly speaking, explanations for the pre-crisis run-up in demand point to distortions that affected either investor beliefs or incentives. Beliefs-based explanations argue that a misunderstanding of the risks of investing in securitizations helped drive investor demand, while incentives-based explanations emphasize agency problems between professional investors and their principals. Explanations for the collapse in demand during the crisis argue that either fire sales or a buyers' strike amplified an initial fundamental shock due to declining home prices. In fire sales-based explanations, the fundamental shock was amplified by forced sales from investors with high valuations to others with low valuations, while in buyers' strike-based explanations, it was amplified by a refusal to trade due to adverse selection or other frictions. 2 While theoretical explanations for the boom and bust abound, empirical work has been hampered by a lack of data on the investors who bought securitizations. 3 In this paper, we use new micro-data on mutual funds' and insurance companies' holdings of fixed-income securities to shed light on the forces that drove the rise and fall of demand for securitizations. Specifically, we study the quarterly fixed-income holdings of mutual funds and insurance companies from [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . These institutions are two of the largest investors in credit securities, owning close to 30% of all corporate 2 bonds and private securitizations. 4 We use this data to pinpoint investor characteristics that were associated with greater holdings of securitizations and to describe investors' trading behavior in securitizations. We then interpret our findings in light of the theoretical literature.
Our analysis focuses on nontraditional securitizations, which consisted of CDOs and MBS backed by nonprime home mortgages. While traditional securitizations backed by prime residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, and consumer debt had existed for decades, nontraditional securitizations were a more recent innovation. And, as Figure 1 securitizations, these increases did not keep pace with the broader credit market-i.e., as issuance boomed, insurers and mutual funds became increasingly underweight relative to the market. Within mutual funds and insurers, a simple variance decomposition of our micro-level holdings data indicates that most variation in nontraditional securitization holdings was variation across investors as opposed to common variation over time.
Which investor characteristics were associated with larger holdings of nontraditional securitizations? We start with mutual funds and estimate cross-sectional regressions relating portfolio weights in nontraditional securitizations to a variety of fund and manager characteristics. Among mutual funds with the same objective, fund manager experience stands out relative to other fund characteristics: experienced managers invested significantly less in nontraditional securitizations than inexperienced managers.
What explains the relationship between fund manager experience and securitization holdings?
Perhaps inexperienced mutual fund managers faced incentives that were more misaligned with those of their shareholders than the incentives faced by experienced managers. We find little evidence of this in our data: inexperienced and experienced managers faced similar performance-flow relationships, a common proxy for the strength of the risk-taking incentives faced by managers. In 3 addition, we examine pairs of regular mutual funds and variable annuity funds that had the same investment objective and were run by the same fund manager. Because they are sold as part of an insurance product, variable annuity funds face weaker performance-flow relationships and therefore risk-taking incentives, than regular mutual funds. However, we find that there was little difference in the holdings of nontraditional securitizations by regular mutual funds and variable annuity funds run by the same manager.
Alternatively, as suggested by the growing literature on reinforcement learning, the greater demand of inexperienced managers may have been due to differences in beliefs. 5 Consistent with this, we find that managers who were active during the credit market disruptions following the 1998
Russian default invested significantly less than other managers. Personal experience during the market disruption mattered: the effect appears to be driven by managers whose funds suffered poor returns or heavy outflows in 1998. Furthermore, prior experience appears to have moderated optimism about house prices during the boom. We find that funds located in MSAs with stronger precrisis home price growth invested more heavily in securitizations, but there is suggestive evidence that this effect was weaker for experienced managers. Overall, these results lend support to the idea that beliefs, shaped in part by prior firsthand experiences, played an important role in driving mutual fund demand for nontraditional securitizations.
Of course, these results do not rule out incentives-based explanations for the pre-crisis surge in demand for nontraditional securitizations. Incentive misalignments may simply not have been sufficiently severe for mutual funds. To analyze a setting where incentive misalignments may have been more important, we turn to our data on insurance companies. Insurers are large regulated financial intermediaries that were perhaps more likely to face the kinds of incentive conflicts that the literature has highlighted.
We follow a similar procedure, estimating cross-sectional regressions relating insurers' portfolio weights in nontraditional securitizations to a variety of firm characteristics. We find that holdings of nontraditional securitizations were higher among larger insurers and insurance companies that had fixed income portfolios managed by external managers. Among the largest 100 insurers, 4 which together comprise almost 90% of total assets, holdings of nontraditional securitizations were concentrated among poorly capitalized insurers. These findings are consistent with the notion that misaligned incentives played a role in driving insurer demand for nontraditional securitizations.
Among small insurers, the key principal-agent relationship was between the insurer, which may have lacked the expertise necessary to directly invest in securitizations, and external portfolio managers.
Among larger insurers, the key principal-agent relationship was between creditors and equity holders.
How did investor demand for securitizations change after the onset of the crisis in mid-2007?
For both mutual funds and insurance companies, we find that trading in nontraditional securitizations with the buyers' strike narrative, which emphasizes market freezes due to adverse selection or other frictions. However, we also show that mutual funds with large holdings of nontraditional securitizations suffered larger outflows during the crisis. Consistent with theories of fire sales where investors follow optimal liquidation strategies, funds met these redemptions primarily by selling liquid government-guaranteed MBS and not by selling illiquid nontraditional securitizations.
Putting it all together, our micro-data on investor holdings of securitizations paints a multifaceted picture of the boom in nontraditional securitization and a more uniform picture of the bust. In the boom, there was significant heterogeneity across investors in the demand for nontraditional securitizations. Among mutual funds, beliefs appear to have been a key driver of holdings of nontraditional securitizations, while incentives appear to have played an important role among insurers. In the bust, investors behaved similarly. They traded very little in nontraditional securitizations, preferring to transact in more liquid securities to meet their liquidity needs.
A few brief notes on our approach are in order before proceeding. First, the aim of this paper is not to advance one specific narrative of the financial crisis. Indeed, it seems unlikely that any one theory alone can completely explain such a complex phenomenon. Second, our analysis is largely descriptive. In the absence of clean natural experiments, we are generally not able to definitively identify causal effects. Instead, we pursue a series of descriptive tests that help shed light on the forces that drove investor demand. We carefully consider factors that may confound our interpretations of these tests, but ultimately our tests remain descriptive. Overall, our goal is to document a series of robust stylized facts that can inform future theoretical and empirical work about the crisis. In this way, our approach is similar to that of Griffin, Harris, Shu, and Topalugua (2011), 5 who describe investor behavior in the dot-com era, and Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014), who study runs on short-term debt in the crisis.
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section I provides background on traditional and nontraditional securitizations. Section II outlines competing theoretical narratives of the surge and subsequent collapse in demand for nontraditional securitizations. Section III explains the data sources we use in the paper. Section IV uses our holdings data to explore the drivers of the boom, while Section V sheds light on the mechanics of the bust. Section VI offers some concluding observations.
I. Background on Securitization
This section provides a brief background on securitization. Securitizations are created by pooling and tranching-assembling a pool of cash-flow-generating financial assets such as loans or debt securities and then issuing claims of various priorities backed by that pool.
In the United States, the securitization of home mortgages dates to the late 1960s and early 1970s, when various Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), corporations that were implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the U.S. government, began issuing securities backed by residential mortgage pools. Only "conforming" mortgages, which must meet certain requirements for size, credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, and documentation, are eligible to be included in GSE mortgage pools.
Because the GSEs guarantee the timely payment of principal and interest on the underlying loans, investors in GSE-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities (GSE MBS) bear little credit risk. The market for GSE MBS grew exponentially during the 1980s and 1990s, eventually overtaking the market for U.S. Treasuries to become the single largest debt market in the U.S. (Fabozzi [2005] ).
The 1980s saw the advent of several types of private securitizations that were not backed by the U.S. government, which we broadly refer to as "traditional securitizations." They include:
Commercial Backed Mortgage Securities (CMBS):
The securitization of commercial mortgages into CMBS was pioneered by investment banks in the early 1980s. However, this market grew to prominence only in the early 1990s when the Resolution Trust Corporation began using it to sell off the commercial real estate loans of failed depository institutions. The CMBS market grew rapidly throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
Consumer Asset-Backed Securities (ABS):

II. Narratives of the Boom and Bust
In this section, we discuss different explanations for the surge and subsequent collapse in demand for nontraditional securitizations. Our aim in this paper is not to advance a specific narrative of the crisis or to definitively test one narrative against another. Instead, we approach the data with a flat prior, with the goal of documenting a series of robust stylized facts that can be used to refine these different explanations and inform future research about the forces that drove investor demand for securitizations.
A. Narratives of the boom
Explanations of the pre-crisis surge in demand for securitizations can be grouped into two broad categories: those that highlight distorted beliefs and those that highlight distorted incentives. that investors treated all AAA-rated securitizations as though they were virtually risk-free. For instance, Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherlund, and Willen (2008) and Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) argue that investors neglected the risk of a substantial nationwide downturn in house prices and therefore believed that a diversified exposure to residential mortgages was almost riskless. Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) suggest that investors focused on credit ratings which reflected expected losses but neglected the systematic risk embedded in securitizations. Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010) and Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2013) argue that investors and rating agencies failed to update their models of loan default in the face of deteriorating loan underwriting standards, thus neglecting the risks associated with lending to riskier households.
Simple versions of the distorted-beliefs explanation for the boom tend not to emphasize heterogeneity among investors or across securities. In these simpler narratives, all investors incorrectly assessed the risks of securitizations, driving up the prices of all AAA-rated securitizations 8 in lock step. In more nuanced versions of this narrative, particular subsets of investors may have been more susceptible to distorted beliefs. For instance, Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) argue that unsophisticated investors were shocked by the swift decline of nationwide home prices. Consistent with this, anecdotal accounts suggest that demand from smaller, less sophisticated investors such as small insurance companies and pension funds played an important role in fueling the boom.
A.2 Incentives
Incentives-based narratives of the boom emphasize agency problems within the financial sector. In these explanations, sophisticated actors within financial institutions correctly understood that securitizations were risky. However, because of the incentives they faced, these agents purchased more securitizations than their ultimate principals would have if acting on their own behalf. These explanations differ primarily in where they locate the critical agency conflict within the financial system. Furthermore, incentives-based explanations frequently highlight heterogeneity across investors because some may have faced worse incentive distortions than others.
For instance, the mutual fund literature typically argues that agency problems between fund managers and investors stem from the performance-flow relationship (Chevalier and Ellison [1997] ).
Since expected fund inflows are a convex function of past performance, managers face incentives to take on risk to maximize their expected future compensation, even if this does not maximize expected fund returns. Thus, according to the incentives view, the more convex the performance-flow relationship a fund manager faced, the larger her holdings of securitizations would have been.
This type of incentive problem may also arise for insurers because they sometimes outsource the management of their portfolios. Because insurers cannot perfectly observe risk taking by external assets managers and risk-adjust their performance, these managers may have an incentive to boost perceived performance by taking excessive risks. This problem may have been particularly acute for highly-rated securitizations because they tend to perform well outside of adverse, low-probability economic states (Acharya, Pagano, and Volpin [2013] and Adrian and Shin [2014] ).
Agency problems between external capital providers and managers at financial institutions can also take the form of risk-shifting as in Jensen and Meckling (1976) . In these narratives, managers acting on behalf of existing shareholders purchased highly-rated securitizations to capture 9 the yield associated with bearing tail risk, increasing the expected payoff to equity, while reducing total firm value at creditors' expense (Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar [2011] Vishny (1997) suggests that other investors may have been reluctant to aggressively lean against these demand shocks. Indeed, they may even have had incentives to "ride" a bubble rather than leaning against it as in DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990b) and Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) . The limited offsetting response by arbitrageurs would then explain why these demand shocks raised equilibrium prices, increasing incentives for issuance.
B. Narratives of the bust
In contrast to the disagreement that exists about the drivers of the boom in securitizations, there is wider consensus about the market collapse from mid-2007 to 2009. The frictionless null hypothesis is that the precipitous drop in the secondary market prices of securitizations during the crisis reflected bad news about fundamental values. Most narratives of the bust go beyond the frictionless null and emphasize mechanisms that amplified the reaction of prices to the bad fundamental news. While there is less consensus on the specific mechanisms that were at work, the two that have received the most attention in the theoretical literature are fire sales and buyers' strikes.
B.1 Fire sales
In fire sales-based explanations, binding leverage constraints forced financial intermediaries-who were the natural holders of securitizations and had the highest valuations-to sell to other investors with lower valuations. The resulting decline in prices further tightened leverage constraints, leading to further forced sales. Thus, fire sales are a natural amplification mechanism whereby some initial moderately bad news could have ultimately had a severe impact on prices. A critical feature of these explanations is that the decline in the prices of securitizations was associated with increased trading activity: the identity of the marginal investor changed because natural holders were forced to sell their holdings to others.
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B.2 Buyers' strikes
In "buyers' strike" explanations for the collapse of nontraditional securitization markets, 
III. Data
A. Mutual fund and insurance holdings
Our primary data set is the Thomson Reuters eMAXX database of quarterly security-level holdings of asset-backed securities by U.S.-domiciled mutual funds and insurance companies.
Thomson Reuters obtains par value holdings data from regulatory filings-Schedule D for insurance companies and Forms N-CSR(S) and N-Q for mutual funds-as well as directly from these investors.
Our sample period runs from 2003Q1-2010Q4, which is long enough to allow us to study changes in the demand for securitizations during the boom as well as during the crisis. Our sample of investorquarter observations conditions on having at least one securitization in the portfolio, including GSE MBS. Thus, the investors that are missing from the sample are those that by regulation or by choice never hold securitizations.
Because the types of distortions in beliefs and incentives posited by the theoretical literature are likely to operate at relatively low frequencies, in most of our cross-sectional analyses we collapse our data to investor-year observations by taking an equal-weighted average within each year. Our analysis of trading behavior during the crisis uses quarterly data because annual data would fail to fully capture the dynamic response of trading to liquidity shocks.
B. Securities
We supplement our holdings data by collecting detailed security-level data from a number of sources. To differentiate between traditional and nontraditional securitizations, we collect comprehensive security data from the three major credit rating agencies-Fitch, Moody's, and S&P-and from Bloomberg. Using this data, we classify securitizations into the six broad collateral types discussed in Section I: (1) GSE MBS, (2) CMBS, (3) consumer ABS, (4) prime private-label RMBS, (5) nonprime private-label RMBS, and (6) CDOs. Our focus is on explaining the demand for the nontraditional securitizations that were at the heart of the credit boom and crisis. We therefore calculate the nontraditional share, the share of nonprime RMBS and CDOs in a given investor's overall bond portfolio. In addition, we collect data on the security's coupon or spread at issuance from Moody's and Bloomberg, the initial credit rating from Fitch, Moody's and S&P, and the time series of outstanding amounts from Bloomberg.
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C. Mutual funds
We also collect data on the characteristics of the investors in our eMAXX data. We obtain mutual fund investment objectives, net assets, returns, and flows from the CRSP Mutual Fund
Database. 13 Our cross-sectional analyses focus on bond and hybrid mutual funds, excluding index funds, equity funds, government bond funds, money market funds, and municipal bond funds. We obtain biographic data on the portfolio managers of mutual funds from Morningstar, including their start and end dates managing different funds. We measure each manager's experience as the number of years since the first time we observe them managing a mutual fund in the Morningstar data.
D. Insurance companies
We obtain insurance company data from AM Best, including information on insurers' assets, capitalization, and AM Best's financial strength rating for individual insurers. 14 Overall, our data on insurance companies is similar to our data on mutual funds, except that we do not have biographic data on insurer portfolio managers.
E. Summary statistics and aggregate holdings
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our main data on mutual funds and insurers. Panel A covers mutual funds and the unit of observation is a fund-year. The median fund has net assets of $256 million and total par bond holdings of $195 million. It is managed by two portfolio managers who average roughly eight years of experience between them. The median fund in our data invested about 1% of its bond portfolio in nontraditional securitizations. Highlighting the importance of crosssectional heterogeneity, the distribution of nontraditional share is highly right-skewed with an average of 4%.
Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics for insurance companies. Because most insurance groups centrally manage the investment portfolios of their subsidiaries, we calculate summary statistics and perform our analyses at the insurance group level. Specifically, we use organizational hierarchy information from AM Best to aggregate holdings and firm characteristics up 13 To do so, we construct a fund-level link between eMAXX and CRSP. We are able to link 84% (2,355 out of 2,813) of mutual funds in eMAXX to CRSP. 14 We are able to match 84% (3,630 out of 4,302) of insurance companies in eMAXX to AM Best. We drop insurer separate accounts, which appear in eMAXX in some years but not others, from our baseline sample.
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to the group level. The size distribution of insurance firms is highly right-skewed with the mean and median firms having $5,652 and $153 million in assets. The mean group had 2% of its aggregate bond portfolio invested in nontraditional securitizations.
Combining our eMAXX holdings data with data from the Flow of Funds and SIFMA, Table 2 reports Panel B of Table 2 shows the evolution of outstanding amounts and holdings of private-label RMBS and CDOs. This panel shows that outstanding RMBS and CDOs grew rapidly during the boom. Although both insurers and mutual funds increased the fraction of their portfolios invested in these securities, they did not keep up with the overall market and became more underweight as issuance boomed. For example, while the share of nonprime RMBS in the overall market for private credit securities grew from 8% in 2003Q2 to 17% in 2007Q2, nonprime RMBS rose from only 4.2% to 5.4% over this period as a share of insurance companies' portfolios. We see similar patterns for mutual funds. These results apply across the capital structures of securitizations: in untabulated results, we find that insurance companies and mutual funds were not tilting their portfolios towards tranches with a particular rating. Approximately 80% of their holdings were rated AAA, which is roughly the share of issuance volume that was AAA-rated.
Overall, the aggregate evidence suggests that demand for nontraditional securitizations did not primarily come from the mutual funds and insurers. 15 Though these investors do not seem to have driven the overall growth of nontraditional securitization, they were still important holders of these products, with about $157 billion in total holdings as of 2007Q2. In the next section, we undertake a detailed analysis of the cross-sectional determinants of insurance company and mutual fund holdings.
To the extent that these investors were affected by the same distorted incentives and beliefs as other investors, the cross-sectional patterns in their holdings should shed light on drivers of the boom in nontraditional securitization more generally.
IV. The Boom
In this section, we use our data to explore the forces that shaped investor demand during the 2003-2007 securitization boom. As discussed in Section II, the two main explanations we explore are those emphasizing distorted incentives and those highlighting distorted beliefs.
A. The importance of investor heterogeneity
The market During the boom, credit spreads on AAA-rated nontraditional securitizations were significantly wider than those on other AAA-rated assets, including traditional securitizations and corporate bonds. The difference in spreads between traditional and nontraditional AAA-rated bonds, while moderate in absolute terms, was economically meaningful relative to typical credit spreads.
Indeed, spreads on AAA-rated nonprime RMBS and CDOs were closer to those on BBB-rated corporate bonds than to those on AAA-rated corporate bonds. During the height of the boom from 2004Q1-2007Q2, AAA-rated spreads averaged 9 basis points (bps) for consumer ABS, 22 bps for nonprime RMBS, and 34 bps for CDOs. This can be compared with corporate bond spreads that averaged 4 bps for AAA-rated bonds and 37 bps for BBB-rated bonds.
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At the same time, we find little cross-sectional dispersion of spreads within a given rating and collateral class. For instance, from 2004Q1-2007Q2 the cross-sectional standard deviation of spreads among AAA-rated consumer ABS averaged 10 bps, whereas the cross-sectional dispersion for AAArated CDOs averaged 12 bps. Thus, the bulk of variation in credit spreads within a given rating was across collateral classes as opposed to within collateral class.
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The wide spreads on nontraditional securitizations are an underappreciated fact about the boom. Conventional descriptions of the boom often neglect heterogeneity across investors and across securities, implicitly assuming that all investors treated all AAA-rated securitizations as nearly riskless. However, the price variation we observe suggests that investor heterogeneity was important.
While some buyers may have treated all AAA-rate securitizations the same, they were infra-marginal.
Indeed, the marginal investor appears to have differentiated between the risks of traditional and nontraditional securitizations. Of course, this fact does not imply that investors got prices "right" during the boom. Given the size and systematic character of the ex-post losses, spreads should presumably have been an order of magnitude larger. However, the wider spreads on nontraditional securitizations suggest that some investors understood the ordinal ranking of risk across products.
Our investor-year panel of holdings underscores the importance of investor heterogeneity in their attitudes towards nontraditional securitizations. Table 3 reports a simple variance decomposition. Panel A shows the fraction of variation in nontraditional share among mutual funds that can be explained by different fixed effects. Most variation in investors' portfolio allocations to nontraditional securitizations was variation across investors, as opposed to common variation over time. Specifically, time fixed effects can explain less than 2% of total variation in the portfolio share of nontraditional securitizations. Investment-objective fixed effects or objective-by-time effects can explain less than 20% of total variation. Fund fixed effects, on the other hand, explain more than 60% of total variation. The remaining columns show that some of the fund-level variation can be explained by similarities among different funds in the same family. However, in large families with at least 10 funds, there was significant within-family variation, suggesting that heterogeneity across individual portfolio mandates and managers played an important role.
Panel B of Table 3 performs a similar exercise for insurers. As with mutual funds, variation across insurers was crucial, and common variation over time can explain less than 1% of total variation in the portfolio share of nontraditional securitizations. We perform the variance decomposition analysis using firm instead of group-level data to show that there was relatively little within-group variation: group fixed effects capture almost as much cross-sectional variation (47%) in nontraditional share as do firm fixed effects (58%). This means that we are unlikely to lose much interesting variation when conducting portfolio holdings analysis using group-level data.
The variation in securitization prices across collateral types and the variation in portfolio shares across investors both suggest that there was important heterogeneity in investor attitudes towards securitizations. To better understand the factors that drove investor demand, we now examine the cross-sectional variation in our holdings data.
B. What explains mutual funds' securitization holdings?
We first examine the cross-sectional determinants of mutual fund holdings of nontraditional securitizations. In Table 4 This effect is economically large compared to the average nontraditional share of 4.5%. inexperienced managers peaked at 8% while that of experienced managers peaked at 5%.
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The distribution of mutual fund right-size is skewed, with the 250 largest funds, or about one third of our sample, accounting for about 90% of aggregate bond holdings. To make sure that our results are not driven by many small funds, in Panel B of Table 4 we estimate our regressions for the subsample of the 250 largest funds. We obtain very similar results for the subsample of large funds.
B.1 What drives the effect of manager inexperience?
One interpretation of the important role of manager experience is that it reflects incentive problems. For instance, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) argue that the shape of the relationship between fund flows and past performance determines the risk-taking incentives facing the fund and show that performance-flow is stronger in younger funds.
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However, Table 5 suggests that inexperienced bond mutual fund managers did not face stronger or more convex performance-flow relationships. We estimate monthly regressions of fund flows (scaled by lagged assets) on lagged fund returns and their interaction with a manager's experience. To capture the dynamics of investor learning about manager skill, in these performance-flow regressions we update a manager's experience each month, and consider a manager to be experienced if she is above the median of the experience distribution at that time. Consistent with the prior literature, we find that fund flows respond strongly to past performance. However, when we interact past performance with experience, we do not find a stronger performance-flow relationship for inexperienced managers. If anything, performance-flow sensitivity appears to be slightly stronger for experienced managers, although the economic magnitude of this effect is small. Figure 2( In Table 6 , we find evidence consistent with this reinforcement learning view. In Panel A, each column defines the experienced dummy as a different cutoff for the first year that the manager started to manage mutual funds. The effect of experience seems to be highly nonlinear-in our data it appears to matter most when a manager has at least seven to eight years of experience. These are the managers who were active during the dislocations of fall 1998, which saw turbulent fluctuations in credit spreads following Russia's default and perhaps learned about tail risk from that episode.
In Panel B, we restrict attention to the subset of experienced managers who managed any fund, not necessarily the one in question, during 1998. The regressions in Panel B show two interesting results. First, managers whose funds suffered poor returns or heavy outflows in 1998 steered clear of nontraditional securitizations in 2007. 22 Second, the subsequent effect of a bad 1998 21 We have also examined fund tracking error and do not find any evidence that inexperienced managers have larger tracking error. Thus, the higher nontraditional share of inexperienced managers does not appear to be part of a broader pattern of deliberate risk taking which would be reflected in a larger tracking error. 22 To capture managers' firsthand experience of bad outcomes, we take the minimum returns or flows across all funds managed by a given manager in 1998. For team-managed funds, we then take the minimum across individual managers.
outcome is weaker for managers who had already accumulated significant experience by 1998.
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Focusing on column (1), less experienced managers whose funds had performed well in 1998 allocated 6% more of their portfolios to nontraditional securitizations in 2007 than other managers.
The reinforcement learning story also suggests that experience may affect the way managers reacted to the surge in house prices during the boom. Specifically, more experienced managers may have been less influenced by positive recent house price appreciation than less experienced managers. attitudes towards nontraditional securitizations. In column 4, we control for the interaction of local price appreciation and manager experience. Although the interaction term is not statistically significant, the pattern of coefficients is suggestive. The interaction between experience and house price appreciation offsets more than half of the direct effect of house price appreciation.
In summary, our evidence suggests a role for reinforcement learning, whereby investors are more likely to understand certain risks only once they have personally experienced bad outcomes.
This adds a dynamic component to recent narratives suggesting that investors bought securitizations because they neglected tail risks (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny [2012] ). Specifically, risks that investors have not experienced for many years would be more likely to be neglected than risks that investors have recently experienced. In other words, the process of "collective forgetting" that contributes to booms and busts may be path dependent.
B.2 Isolating the effects of performance flow
While differences in incentives generated by performance flow do not appear to be driving our results on manager experience, they could still be an important determinant of mutual fund investments in nontraditional securitizations. Because they are sold as a part of an insurance product, variable annuity funds are likely to face weaker performance-flow relationships than regular mutual funds. Table 8 shows this is the case.
CRSP has little coverage of variable annuities prior to 2008Q3. As a result, we can only look at the performance-flow relationship after the crisis. Specifically, we use monthly data for the January 2009
to June 2013 period. We include all bond and hybrid funds and do not limit the sample to funds in our eMAXX data. Comparing the coefficients on past returns interacted with fund-type dummies, the performance-flow relationship for regular mutual funds is about twice as strong as that for variable annuity funds. The performance-flow relationship is depicted graphically in Figure 3 (a).
Given such a large difference in the performance-flow relationship, the incentives story would predict that regular funds would engage in more risk taking than comparable variable annuity funds.
To study the effects of these differences in performance flow on nontraditional share, we construct a sample of fund pairs with the same investment objective where one fund is a variable annuity fund, and its paired fund is a regular mutual fund managed by the same portfolio manager. We start with a sample of 328 variable annuity funds in our eMAXX data as of 2003Q4. We then manually search for a regular mutual fund that is offered by the same fund adviser.
We are able to find matching funds for 158 variable annuity funds. Therefore, we next turn to our data on insurance company holdings.
C. What explains insurers' securitization holdings?
Insurance companies are the single largest institutional holder of credit securities. Moreover, since they are heavily regulated financial intermediaries, their holdings may give us insight into the incentive problems generated by such regulation.
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Following the same approach as in Table 4, Table 9 examines the cross-sectional determinants of insurers' nontraditional share over time. Three main facts emerge from the table.
First, life insurers tended to hold more nontraditional securitizations than property and casualty (P&C) insurers. This may reflect the fact that payouts on life insurance policies are more predictable than payouts on P&C policies. Thus, life insurers effectively have a more stable funding base than P&C insurers, enabling them to take more risk as in Hanson, Shleifer, Stein, and Vishny (2014).
Second, larger insurers tended to hold more nontraditional securitizations than did smaller 25 The experience of insurance company portfolio managers could have also played a role in driving their holdings of nontraditional securitizations. In untabulated results, we find some suggestive evidence consistent with this: public insurance companies that experienced worse stock returns during the 1998 crisis invested less in nontraditional securitizations in the mid-2000s. However, because our data on insurers lacks detailed biographical information on portfolio managers, we cannot perform the same detailed analysis for insurers that we do for mutual funds.
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insurers. A one-standard-deviation increase in size was associated with a 0.9% higher nontraditional share, or about half of the average share of 2%. This may reflect the fact that there are fixed costs involved in investing in securitizations because it requires trading expertise and analytical infrastructure that is quite different from that required for corporate bonds. Larger insurers have larger portfolios over which they can amortize these fixed costs.
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The third main fact is consistent with the idea that investing in securitizations requires specialized knowledge and infrastructure: insurers with portfolios run by external managers held more nontraditional securitizations. This may reflect the fact that insurers could economize on their investing infrastructure by outsourcing part of their portfolio management to external managers. But it may also reflect an incentive conflict: if insurers could not perfectly risk-adjust performance, external managers may have been able to increase their compensation by taking excessive risks.
Since they perform well in most states of the world, nontraditional securitizations may have been a particularly good avenue for such risk taking.
The insurance industry is even more concentrated than the mutual fund industry. In our data, the top 100 insurers held approximately 90% of total assets. (The cutoff for inclusion in the top 100 insurers has been stable over time at around $8 billion in total assets.) Since these large insurers likely had the scale necessary to invest in securitizations internally, it may be the case that there were different determinants of holdings of nontraditional securitizations among large insurers than among small insurers. To assess this possibility, Panel B of Table 9 replicates Panel A, restricting the sample to the top 100 insurers by size. Two main differences stand out. First, large insurers that used external managers did not hold more nontraditional securitizations than those using internal managers. This is consistent with the idea that larger insurers had the expertise necessary to effectively monitor their external managers and prevent excessive risk taking.
Second, among large insurers, those with lower capitalization levels invested significantly more in nontraditional securitizations. We hold the definition of capitalization constant over time to ensure that the results are not driven by shifts in the set of insurers that have low capital ratios. The economic magnitude is meaningful. A one-standard deviation increase in capitalization was associated with a 1.7% decrease in nontraditional share, relative to a mean share of 3.8%.
These results are consistent with the idea that risk-shifting was an important driver of nontraditional securitization holdings among large insurers. Equity holders are residual claimants on the value of an insurer's asset portfolio net of policyholder claims. An insurer's capitalization level may reflect the strength of the agency conflict between its equity holders and its creditors, including state guarantee funds. To combat this problem, regulators require insurance companies to maintain minimum levels of capital on a risk-adjusted basis. However, to the extent that these regulations are imperfect, poorly-capitalized insurers could have had stronger risk-shifting incentives and therefore have been more likely to hold nontraditional securitizations. Table 9 lends support to the idea that incentive problems played a role in driving insurer demand for nontraditional securitizations. Heterogeneity among insurers is important: different incentive problems appear to matter for different insurers. Among smaller insurers, the key principalagent relationship was between the insurer, which may have lacked the expertise necessary to directly invest in securitizations, and external portfolio managers. Among larger insurers, the key principalagent relationship appears to have been between debt and equity holders.
In summary, our evidence suggests that both distorted beliefs and distorted incentives are likely part of the explanation for the pre-crisis surge in demand for nontraditional securitizations.
Heterogeneity across investors is important: beliefs appear to have played an important role among mutual funds, while incentives appear to have played an important role among insurance companies. 
V. The Bust
A. Aggregate trading patterns
As discussed in Section II, different explanations for the bust have different implications for aggregate trading patterns. The fundamentals-driven narrative suggests little reason for trading behavior to change with the onset of the financial crisis. In contrast, the conventional fire-sales narrative suggests increased trade at the beginning of the crisis, while the buyers' strike narrative suggests a collapse in trading volume.
In Figure 4 , we begin by analyzing the time series of aggregate transactions by insurance companies. The figure shows the time series of aggregate insurer transactions by collateral type. We plot turnover, defined as the total par value of transactions (the sum of buys and sells) normalized by total average par holdings. Thus, if insurers sold all of their subprime RMBS holdings and bought subprime RMBS with the same par value, subprime RMBS turnover would be 200%. We take a fourquarter moving average to smooth the resulting series. As reference points, we also plot turnover for GSE MBS, which are relatively liquid, and corporate bonds, which are relatively illiquid. In untabulated results, we find similar aggregate trading patterns for mutual funds. We focus on insurers because eMAXX provides data on actual insurer transactions. For mutual funds, we do not directly observe transactions and must impute transactions from changes in holdings, adjusted for the change in each security's amount outstanding due to defaults and prepayments. 27 The results for mutual funds are similar to those for insurance companies. Turnover in nonprime RMBS fell from Overall, the aggregate trading patterns in our data seem more consistent with the buyers' strike than with the fire-sales narrative of the fall of nontraditional securitization. Trading volume plummeted at the same time that prices collapsed. In contrast, simple versions of the fire-sales story suggest that outsized declines in prices were mediated by high volumes of secondary market trade.
One major caveat to this interpretation is that we do not observe the full universe of 27 While the overall par dollars of nontraditional securitizations held by mutual fund and insurers fell during the crisis, this primarily reflected prepayments and defaults as opposed to trade. When the collateral in a securitization prepays or defaults, the par holdings of all investors in the securitization decline. We use security-level data from Bloomberg on par outstandings to verify that the decline in holdings was driven by default and prepayments. Specifically, insurers and mutual funds held a constant fraction of the amount outstanding, but the total outstanding declined.
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securitization holders or transactions: we only observe trades where at least one party was an insurer or mutual fund. However, as noted above, insurers and mutual funds hold a large fraction of total credit assets. To the extent that fire sales resulted in the aggregate transfer of security holdings from highly-levered intermediaries such as hedge funds and broker-dealers to the broad class of investors who operate with lower leverage, such as mutual funds and insurers, our data should capture at least one side of the transaction. Nonetheless, it remains possible that there were widespread fire sales which led to a significant reallocation of securitization holdings amongst highly-levered intermediaries, but not between leveraged intermediaries and the investors our data cover.
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If mutual funds and insurers transacted little in nontraditional securitizations, how did they meet their liquidity needs during the crisis? To answer this question, we explore the cross-sectional variation in trading patterns. Specifically, we ask whether distressed mutual funds and insurers were more likely to sell nontraditional securitizations than others. Even though these investors sold little in the aggregate, cross-sectional results may help to shed light on how other investors might have traded in response to liquidity shocks during the crisis.
B. Cross-sectional trading patterns
We begin by analyzing the trading behavior of mutual funds. For mutual funds, we have a simple proxy for liquidity shocks: fund flows. In untabulated results, we find that mutual funds with higher nontraditional shares experienced larger outflows during the crisis. Investors started withdrawing from funds with high nontraditional shares during the second half of 2007, and by the height of the crisis in the second half of 2008, a one standard deviation change in nontraditional share (about 9%) was associated with about 6.3% larger (annualized) outflows.
How did mutual funds facing redemptions meet their liquidity needs during the crisis? Table   10 asks which types of securitizations funds bought and sold in response to inflows and outflows. We examine net purchases of consumer ABS, GSE MBS, CMBS, and nontraditional securitizations, each 28 Amplification could also occur in a manner similar to the traditional fire-sale mechanism, but involving little secondary market trade. For instance, an initial decline in RMBS prices could have changed the marginal investor in RMBS from specialized trading desks or investment vehicles to corporate headquarters within a financial institution. If headquarters responded by imposing stricter capital requirements on RMBS positions, this may have led to a further decline in quoted prices, which may have led headquarters to impose even stricter requirements. The resulting spiral could have amplified the drop in prices even in the absence of secondary volume. Anecdotally, there were several large transactions involving the transfer of securitizations within the same conglomerate from structured investment vehicles and other specialized offbalance sheet vehicles to a firm's balance sheet during the crisis (e.g., Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez [2013] We next turn to insurance company transactions in Table 11 . As in our analysis of mutual funds, the dependent variables are net purchases of consumer ABS, GSE MBS, CMBS, and nontraditional securitizations, each scaled by the firm's lagged holdings of that securitization type and winsorized at the 5 th and 95 th percentiles. We use the percent change in the size of the insurer's overall fixed income portfolio as our proxy for liquidity shocks. This is similar to our use of fund flows in our analysis of mutual fund transactions. Table 11 shows the types of securitizations insurers bought or sold when their overall portfolios grew or shrank. The results are qualitatively similar to the results of our mutual fund 29 We obtain qualitatively similar results if use median regressions, which are less influenced to outliers, or if we cap the dependent variable at 100%. 30 The two exceptions are the coefficients on outflows interacted with crisis in the regressions of consumer ABS and GSE MBS that do not include objective-time fixed effects. Both suggest increased propensity to meet outflows during the crisis through sales of GSE MBS and consumer ABS. 
VI. Conclusion
Nontraditional securitizations-nonprime RMBS and CDOs-were at the heart of the recent financial crisis. The demand for these securities helped feed the housing boom during the early and mid-2000s, while rapid declines in their prices during 2007 and 2008 generated large losses for financial intermediaries, ultimately imperiling their soundness and triggering a full-blown crisis.
There are many anecdotal narratives and theoretical models of the rise and fall of demand for securitizations, but little systematic empirical evidence. Using micro-data on insurers' and mutual funds' holdings of both traditional and nontraditional securitizations, this paper begins to shed light on the economic forces that drove the demand for securitizations before and during the crisis. 31 The coefficients in Table 11 are generally smaller in magnitude than the proportional benchmarks of one and negative one. This appears to reflect extreme outliers in the independent variable, overall portfolio growth. We recover coefficients closer to one when we exclude quarterly portfolio growth rates outside [-25%, 25%] . In addition, it could be the case that insurers transacted heavily in the Treasury market, which our data does not cover.
We document a number of robust stylized facts about the demand for nontraditional securitizations. First, heterogeneity across securitization types and investors is key to understanding the crisis. Beliefs appear to have been an important driver of mutual fund holdings of nontraditional securitizations. Although they did not face stronger performance-flow relationships, inexperienced mutual fund managers invested significantly more in these products than experienced managers.
Consistent with the idea that beliefs-shaped by past firsthand experiences-played an important role, managers who had suffered through the market dislocations of 1998 invested substantially less in nontraditional securitizations than those who had not.
For insurance companies, incentives appear to have played an important role, though the nature of the relevant incentive conflict seems to have varied across small and larger insurance firms.
Among larger insurers, the key principal-agent relationship was between debt and equity holders.
Overall, our evidence suggests that different motivations are important for understanding the holdings of different investor types.
While investor heterogeneity is important in the boom, the story of the bust is more uniform.
In our data, the bust is characterized by a decline in aggregate trading volume for nontraditional securitizations. Consistent with the idea that adverse selection and other frictions contributed to a buyers' strike in these markets, prices fell significantly, even though very little trade took place.
Insurers and mutual funds that needed liquidity transacted largely in the market for GSE MBS. Our results underscore the importance of optimal liquidity management in the context of fire sales.
Figure 1 Issuance and Spreads on Traditional and Nontraditional Securitizations
This figure shows quarterly issuance and credit spreads on traditional and nontraditional securitizations. The underlying data is from SDC. Panel A plots quarterly issuance of traditional and nontraditional securitizations. Traditional securitizations include CMBS, prime RMBS, consumer ABS, and other ABS. Nontraditional securitizations include non-prime RMBS and CDOs. Panel B plots the credit spreads on newly issued AAA-rated securitizations versus the spreads on corporate bonds. Each quarter we compute the value-weighted average credit spread on securitizations, based on the underlying collateral. We compute this average for traditional consumer asset-backed securities backed by credit card loans, automotive loans, student loans, and other personal loans ("Consumer ABS"); private residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) backed by subprime and Alt-A mortgages ("Non-Prime RMBS"); commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS); and collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs"). To avoid benchmarking issues we restrict attention to the spreads on floating rate notes indexed to 1-, 3-, and 6-month LIBOR. For reference we plot the average secondary spreads over LIBOR (based on interest rate swaps) on 3-year AAA and BBB-rated corporate bonds from Barclays. 
Figure 2 Mutual Fund Manager's Experience and Nontraditional Share
Panel A reports the average nontraditional share of mutual funds managed by experienced versus inexperienced portfolio managers. We split mutual funds into two groups based on the median value of the fund manager's experience. Manager experience is measured as of 2004Q4. For team-managed funds we take the average of individual managers. Panel B reports the strength of the performance-flow relationship in mutual funds managed by experienced versus inexperienced managers. Fund flows are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We first adjust monthly fund returns and net flows for objective-month fixed e↵ects. The figure then shows the mean of adjusted fund flows by decile of adjusted performance. Each month we define experienced funds are those with fund managers above the median of experience across all funds at that point time.
(a) Nontraditional Share We aggregate all buy and sell transactions in a given collateral type across all insurance companies and scale it by the average value of aggregate holdings during quarters t 1 and t. In other words, aggregate turnover in collateral type c in quarter t is , 2003-2010 This table reports estimates of the outstanding balance of US asset-backed securities by underlying collateral type. The sources for estimated outstanding are listed in the footnotes. For each collateral type, we compute aggregate par holdings by insurers and mutual funds using our eMAXX holdings data. For the market, % refers to the share of a given collateral type in the aggregate outstanding amount of all private credit securities. For insurance and mutual funds, % refers to the shares of a given collateral type in the aggregate portfolios of insurance firms and mutual funds. 
The sample of funds consists of bond and hybrid mutual funds. The sample period is 2003-2010. Fund flows are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Objective-date fixed e↵ects are included. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by fund. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
(1) (2) 
The sample consists of all funds with objective information in CRSP Mutual Fund Database. where i indexes funds, s indexes types of securitizations, and t indexes quarters. Net purchases are scaled by lagged holdings and winsorized at the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles. Fund flows are scaled by lagged total net assets, and are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Inflows are equal to max(0, Fund flows). Outflows are equal to max(0, Fund flows). Crisis is 2007Q3-2009Q2. In models 1, 3, 5, and 7, that do not include objective-date fixed e↵ects, standard errors are adjusted for clustering by objective-date. In models 2, 4, 6, and 8, that include objective-date fixed e↵ects, robust standard errors are reported. The bottom panel reports the p-values from the tests of proportional purchases and liquidations of di↵erent types of securitizations in response to fund inflows and outflows. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
